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Abstract—Phishing is a major concern on the Internet today 
and many users are falling victim because of criminal’s deceitful 
tactics.  Blacklisting is still the most common defence users have 
against such phishing websites, but is failing to cope with the 
increasing number. 
In recent years, researchers have devised modern ways of 
detecting such websites using machine learning.  One such 
method is to create machine learnt models of URL features to 
classify whether URLs are phishing.  However, there are varying 
opinions on what the best approach is for features 
and algorithms. 
In this paper, the objective is to evaluate the performance of 
the Random Forest algorithm using a lexical only dataset.  The 
performance is benchmarked against other machine learning 
algorithms and additionally against those reported in the 
literature.  Initial results from experiments indicate that the 
Random Forest algorithm performs the best yielding an 
86.9% accuracy. 
Keywords—Phishing, URL, machine learning, Random Forest, 
lexical features 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Phishing is a method used by criminals to deceive and trick 
users into releasing personal and sensitive data, such as their 
identity or financial information.  Criminals can achieve this by 
employing social engineering tactics to spoof the user.  For 
example, one such tactic is through email.  Often a criminal, or 
phisher, will send emails to vulnerable users that will request 
personal data and lure them into clicking Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL) links to malicious web pages [1]. 
Phishing attacks are growing.  The Anti Phishing Work 
Group reported that between January 2016 and June 2016 the 
number of unique phishing sites was 466,065, which was 61% 
higher than the previous quarter [2]. 
At present, blacklisting is the most common anti-phishing 
technique used [3].  Blacklists are populated using various 
techniques, such as honeypots, web crawlers combined with 
analysis heuristics and user reported URLs [4].  Unfortunately, 
not all malicious URLs are in blacklists as they could be too 
new, were never found or were never evaluated properly [4]. 
To deal with the growing number of malicious phishing 
URLs, another method of detection is to employ the use of 
machine learning algorithms and in this paper, the focus is on 
the Random Forest (RF) [5] algorithm to classify URLs as 
either malicious or benign. 
RF is an ensemble algorithm introduced by Leo Breiman 
that generates a vector of decision trees.  Each tree is generated 
using a bootstrap sample from the dataset and upon each split 
in the tree, the algorithm chooses the best feature from a 
random subset of features.  To select the best feature, a 
measure of purity is computed and a feature found to have the 
smallest value of purity is selected.  When classifying an 
instance, the RF algorithm uses the most frequently predicted 
class, also known as voting [6]. 
For this ongoing work, the classification of URLs will be 
lexical based, which means features will be extracted directly 
from the URL itself, for example, a character count of the 
domain.  If URLs “look” malicious, such features can assist the 
learning process to find the tell-tale signs of what makes those 
URLs malicious [4].  The lexical based approach is considered 
lightweight when compared to other external features, which 
may require the resource of a real-time system.  Thus, there is 
no delay in the classification [4, 7, 8].  In addition, previous 
studies have shown that using lexical features with additional 
features has only a slightly better accuracy than just solely 
using lexical features [4, 9]. 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how effective the 
RF algorithm is at classifying malicious URLs against three 
other algorithms, J48, Naïve Bayes and Logistic Regression.  
The comparison will be based upon how each algorithm does 
in terms of accuracy, sensitivity (recall) and specificity and will 
further show that the RF algorithm can produce the lowest false 
negatives.  This is important because if any algorithm, not just 
RF, that classifies a URL as benign when it is malicious can 
potentially cause more harm for the user. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Basnet, Sung and Liu [3] discovered RF to be the best out 
of 7 other algorithms in terms of accuracy and speed.  
Additionally, they adopt the lexical approach choosing features 
believed to be “phishing like” and using solely lexical features 
they report an 85.38% accuracy with a false positive rate of 
8.22% [3]. 
Le, Markopoulou and Faloutsos [9] discuss how effective 
lexical features are over using full features for phishing URLs.  
Their full feature set includes lexical, but also external features, 
where they query the WHOIS and Team Cymru servers for 
registration and geolocation data, respectively.  They find that 
when experimenting with the online learning algorithms 
Confidence Weight and Adaptive Regularisation of Weights, 
the results show that lexical features are comparable to the full 
set with only a 1% difference in accuracy for both 
algorithms [9]. 
Ma, Saul, Savage and Voelker [4] explore the potential of 
machine learning on lexical and host based features of URLs.  
They state that lexical features tend to “look different”, whilst 
host based features describe “where”, “who” and “how” URLs 
are managed.  Their data are run against 4 machine learning 
algorithms: Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines (one with a 
linear kernel and the other with an RBF kernel) and Logistic 
Regression.  They report that, when running the lexical features 
dataset, using Logistic Regression yields a 98.07% accuracy, 
whereas running full features (lexical and host based) using the 
same algorithm yields a 98.76% accuracy [4]. 
Garera, Provos, Chew and Rubin [1] provide a framework 
for detecting malicious URLs.  They explain that there are 4 
types of obfuscation to a URL that can be shown to be 
recognised as phishing.  These are Type I (obfuscating the host 
with an IP address), Type II (obfuscating the host with another 
domain), Type III (obfuscating with large host names) and 
Type IV (domain unknown or misspelled).  They use this 
approach with page and domain based features, as well as hand 
selecting 8 words they believe to be common amongst phishing 
URLs.  In their work, the Logistic Regression algorithm was 
chosen and following evaluation received an average accuracy 
of 97.31% with a true positive rate of 95.8% and a false 
positive rate of 1.2% on their testing dataset [1]. 
Darling, Heileman, Gressel, Ashok and Poornachandran [8] 
describe a lexical approach to classifying malicious URLs 
using the J48 algorithm in Weka.  They state that classification 
needs to be lightweight to reduce the delay to real-time 
systems.  The training dataset used consists of 131,402 URLs 
with a 50/50 split between benign and malicious classes and 
consists of 87 lexical features, which are categorised into 6 
groups: n-grams, lengths, counts, patterns, binaries and ratios.  
The results of J48 against the training dataset show a 99.1% 
accuracy with a false positive rate of 1.7% and a false negative 
rate of 0.5% [8]. 
III. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Data 
The data are retrieved from two online sources, one for 
benign URLs and the other for malicious URLs. 
The benign URL dataset was retrieved from the DMOZ 
Open Directory website [10] on the 23rd of February 2016.  
The DMOZ Open Directory is a free, open source and 
community based website that allows users to browse the 
directory and suggest URLs.  In addition, other users can 
volunteer to edit the directory, which allows for some 
validation of URLs prior to them being added, modified or 
deleted in the DMOZ [11]. 
The malicious URL dataset was retrieved from the 
PhishTank website [12] on the 24th of February 2016 and all 
URLs were verified as malicious at the time of retrieval.  
PhishTank is a free community website that allows users to 
submit, verify, track and share phishing URL data [13]. 
The online datasets retrieved were both cleansed by 
removing any duplicates and for the experiments both a 
training and testing set were created.  The training set consists 
of 4000 URLs, 3000 from the benign set and 1000 from the 
malicious set.  The testing set consists of 7000 URLs, 3000 
from the benign set and 4000 from the malicious set.  All 
URLs were selected randomly, except any URLs selected in 
the testing set do not include those that were present in the 
training set. 
The next step was to extract features from the URLs.  The 
features obtained were those used in the literature [1, 3, 9] and 
the reason is twofold.  The results published, firstly, proves that 
the features are a good baseline and secondly, provides a better 
comparison of algorithm results to other researchers.  Table I 
provides a list of the features used and extracted from the 
URLs, and includes the class label. 
To ensure equality between features, all numeric values 
were normalised, so their values lie between 0 and 1.  All 
features in Table I are counts and binary values of specific 
entities within the URL. 
TABLE I.  EXTRACTED FEATURES 
L_Host_Len L_Semicolon_In_Path L_Hyphen_Count_In_Host 
L_Dot_In_Host L_Comma_In_Path L_Host_LongestTokenLen 
L_Dot_In_Path L_Has_Query L_Path_NumOfSubDirs 
L_Dot_In_URL L_Equals_In_Query L_Path_LongestSubDirTokenLen 
L_Path_Len L_Has_Fragment L_Path_NumOfDelimitersNotDots 
L_URL_Len L_AtSign_In_URL L_Filename_Len 
L_Hyphen_In_Host L_Username_In_URL L_Filename_NumOfDots 
L_Digit_In_Host L_Password_In_URL L_Filename_NumOfHyphenAndUnderscores 
L_IP_Host L_NonStdPort L_Arguments_Len 
L_Hex_Host L_Underscore_In_Path L_Arguments_Count 
L_Hyphen_In_Path L_URL_BlacklistedWordAppears L_Arguments_LenOfLongestArgVal 
L_ForwardSlash_In_Path L_Host_HasPortNum L_Arguments_NumOfOtherDelimitersInValues 
L_Equals_In_Path L_Host_NumOfTokens Class 
 B. Methodology 
For the experiments, 4 machine learning algorithms were 
run in Weka [14], these are Naïve Bayes (NB), Logistic 
Regression (LR), J48 (also known as the C4.5 algorithm) and 
Random Forest (RF).  Apart from LR, all algorithms were run 
with the default settings.  The ridge parameter for LR was set 
to prevent the algorithm from placing too much weight on 
coefficients.  The reason being is that if too much weight is 
placed on certain features, the algorithm becomes prone to 
overfitting the data. 
All models were trained first using 10-fold cross validation.  
The results in the next section are for the testing dataset and are 
presented in terms of the accuracy, sensitivity and specificity 
using the definition in the work by [15].  The measure in each 
definition is calculated using values that demonstrate the 
performance of a classifier.  A contingency table has been used 
to define these values in this work (Table II), where TP is the 
true positive, TN is the true negative, FP is the false positive 
and FN is the false negative. 
Accuracy is a measure of how many instances were 
correctly classified out of all instances classified, it is defined 
in (1) [15]. 
 (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN) 
Sensitivity (also known as recall or the true positive rate) is 
a measure of the positive instances that have been correctly 
classified as positive over all instances declared positive in the 
dataset, it is defined in (2) [15]. 
 TP / (TP + FN) 
Specificity (also known as the true negative rate) is a 
measure of the negative instances that have been correctly 
classified as negative over all instances declared negative in the 
dataset, it is defined in (3) [15]. 
 TN / (TN + FP) 
 
TABLE II.  CONTINGENCY TABLE EXAMPLE 
  Classification 
  Malicious Benign 
Actual 
Malicious TP FN 
Benign FP TN 
C. Results 
The initial results (Table III) prove that the RF algorithm is 
a better choice for the data as it can more accurately classify 
the data whilst keeping the false negatives moderately low.  
Furthermore, our results agree with the published work of [3]. 
The main aim of this work is to get the false negatives as 
low as possible, as these instances are classified as benign 
when in fact they are malicious.  RF was the only algorithm to 
get this as low as possible when compared to the other three 
algorithms.  In contrast to this, RF obtained the highest number 
of false positives when compared to the other three algorithms.  
False positives are instances that are classified as malicious 
when in fact they are benign.  As such, false positives are an 
important measure in classification, but they are not 
emphasised in this work because if a benign URL has been 
classed as malicious, the level of risk to the user will remain 
unchanged.  In other words, the user remains protected. 
After training the RF model, the feature importance was 
obtained to determine what features the algorithm considered 
the most important.  In this work, the feature importance is 
computed by counting the number of nodes used by each 
feature listed in Table I, excluding the class.  The top 6 
important features have been listed in Table IV.  In addition, 
using the URL in Fig. 1 as an example, the table also illustrates 
what text would be extracted and what the computed value 
would be from the extraction for each feature. 
 
TABLE III.  EXPERIMENT RESULTS (TESTING DATASET) 
Algorithm Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity False Positives False Negatives 
NB 64.6% 39.7% 97.7% 69 2412 
LR 81.5% 70.5% 96.1% 118 1180 
J48 83.9% 75.0% 95.8% 126 1002 
RF 86.9% 80.5% 95.4% 138 782 
 
 http://www.kingston.ac.uk/aboutkingstonuniversity/ 
Fig. 1. Example URL 
TABLE IV.  FEATURE IMPORTANCE (TOP 6) 
Rank Feature Node Count Extraction Example Value  
1 L_Host_LongestTokenLen 5032 www.kingston.ac.uk 8 
2 L_Host_Len 4945 www.kingston.ac.uk 18 
3 L_URL_Len 4944 (See Fig. 1) 50 
4 L_Path_Len 3879 aboutkingstonuniversity/ 24 
5 L_Path_LongestSubDirTokenLen 3052 aboutkingstonuniversity/ 23 
6 L_Path_NumOfSubDirs 1584 aboutkingstonuniversity/ 2 
 
The first and most important feature is 
L_Host_LongestTokenLen, which contains the longest token 
length from the hostname.  This feature is used by [9] and they 
split the hostname into tokens using these characters as 
delimiters: a forward slash (/), a question mark (?), a full stop 
(.), an equals sign (=), an underscore (_), an ampersand (&) and 
a hyphen (-).  After splitting the hostname, a search is 
performed to find the length of the longest token [9], which in 
the example above is 8 because kingston is the longest token. 
The second, third and fourth features are L_Host_Len, 
L_URL_Len and L_Path_Len, which are the total lengths of the 
hostname, URL and path, respectively. 
Similarly, to the first feature, the fifth feature is 
L_Path_LongestSubDirTokenLen, also used by [9], which 
removes the filename (if present) and the beginning forward 
slash (/) from the path.  The path is then split into tokens using 
the forward slash (/) character.  After splitting, a search is 
performed to find the length of the longest token [9], which in 
the example above is 23 because aboutkingstonuniversity is 
the longest and only token. 
The last feature is L_Path_NumOfSubDirs, this attribute 
uses the path of the URL, which ignores the filename (if 
present) and the beginning forward slash (/).  The result is split 
into tokens using the forward slash (/) character and a count of 
tokens is retrieved.  In the example, the path 
aboutkingstonuniversity/ has 2 tokens: 
aboutkingstonuniversity and a blank value, which is where 
the filename would normally reside. 
IV. FUTURE WORK 
The main aim of this work is to lower the false negative 
value and the initial results indicate that this could be possible 
by introducing a cost matrix, which would penalise the false 
negatives, however, this needs further investigation.  A 
comprehensive review of different levels of penalisation will 
need to be performed to evaluate what effect these have on the 
RF algorithm in terms of accuracy, false positives and 
false negatives. 
In addition, a bag-of-words approach will be explored to 
evaluate how the RF algorithm will perform when adding 
more features. 
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